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Abstract: This article examines the rationale behind the massive increase in 
Japanese foreign exchange market intervention operations in 2003-04, and evaluates its 
effectiveness both in limiting yen exchange rate appreciation and influencing the 
direction of monetary policy. The two main questions addressed in this study are: Was 
the intervention effective in slowing exchange rate appreciation compared to a 
counterfactual case with no intervention? And, has intervention on such a large scale 
authorized by the Ministry of Finance been able to directly influence liquidity creation or 
indirectly influence the stance of Bank of Japan policy? 
 
JEL Classification: E51, E58, F31. 
 
Keywords: Foreign Exchange Intervention, Japanese Monetary Policy. 
 
 
* We thank Xueyan Guo for valuable research assistance. Fatum gratefully acknowledges 
financial support from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
(SSHRC).
1. Introduction 
 
Japanese foreign exchange market intervention reached a new high in 2003, with the 
Bank of Japan selling 20.2 trillion yen ($177 billion) in exchange for dollars—an amount 
surpassing that of any other country at any time. Massive dollar-support intervention 
operations continued in the first quarter of 2004, during which time the authorities sold 
another 14.8 trillion yen ($139 billion) until March 17 at which time operations abruptly 
ended.1 Despite these efforts the yen exchange rate appreciated more than 14 percent 
during these 15 months, moving from 119 to 104 yen per dollar. (See Figure 1) Although 
Japan has been the most active amongst the larger industrial economies in its foreign 
exchange market operations during the past decade and more, the recent magnitude 
dwarfs all previous experience. (Intervention in 2002, for example, amounted to 4.0 
trillion yen and operations only occurred in the second quarter).  
Heavy intervention operations took place while conventional monetary policy 
instruments-- interest rates and base money growth-- were seemingly ineffective in 
stopping the Japanese deflation. The overnight interbank rate (collateralized overnight 
call rate) was lowered to virtually zero in early 1999 and remained close to that level, 
never rising above 1/2 percent, for more than five years.2 (The rate was 0.001 percent 
during all of 2003 and the first nine months of 2004). The key monetary aggregate 
(M2+CDs) rose at only about 1.5-2.0 percent (annualized rate) during 2003 and the first 
half of 2004 despite the monetary base growing at an annualized rate of over 14 percent 
during this period.3 Japanese deflation continued in 2003-04 as the GDP deflator fell at 
an annual rate of about -2.5 percent.4 The Japanese price level has been declining by 
several measures since the mid-1990s. (See Figure 2) 
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 This article examines the rationale behind the massive increase in Japanese 
foreign exchange market intervention operations in 2003-04, and evaluates its 
effectiveness both in limiting yen exchange rate appreciation and influencing the 
direction of monetary policy. The two main questions addressed in this study are: Was 
the intervention effective in slowing exchange rate appreciation compared to a 
counterfactual case with no intervention? And, has intervention on such a large scale 
authorized by the Ministry of Finance been able to directly influence liquidity creation or 
indirectly influence the stance of Bank of Japan policy? The Ministry of Finance 
determines intervention policy but the Bank of Japan determines whether to "sterilize" or 
offset the liquidity effect of selling yen for dollars in the market (and also acts as the 
agent for the ministry in carrying out foreign exchange operations). In principle, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan operate independently, but in practice may 
influence each other's policy stance. The sharp jump in the monetary base in 2003-04, 
shown in Figure 3, could be associated with the intensity and unprecedented magnitude 
of yen sales/dollar purchase foreign exchange intervention. One objective of our study is 
to investigate the response of the Bank of Japan to the shift in Ministry of Finance policy.  
 The next section provides some institutional details on foreign exchange market 
intervention operations in Japan. Section 3 reviews recent evidence on the effectiveness 
of Japanese foreign exchange market intervention and presents some new results on this 
topic. Section 4 presents evidence on the extent to which intervention operations have 
been sterilized. Section 5 discusses the broader question of how the Bank of Japan may 
have changed it's policy direction to accommodate heavy foreign-currency intervention 
purchases in 2003-04. Section 6 concludes the article.  
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 2. Institutions 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) in Japan has responsibility for foreign exchange market 
policy5, though the Bank of Japan (BOJ) acts as its agent in carrying out the market 
operations by using an account of the government called the Foreign Exchange Fund 
Special Account (FEFSA)6. This fund consists of foreign currency funds and yen funds. 
Financing Bills (FBs; short-term government bills) are issued by the MOF to the market 
to obtain yen funds for the FEFSA, that in turn is used to purchase the foreign currency 
denominated assets.7 The financing bills (denominated in yen) are issued domestically to 
obtain yen funds before the foreign exchange purchase (yen sales), so in a technical sense 
the intervention is automatically sterilized8. Financial bills are rolled over, when foreign 
currency denominated assets are maintained as foreign reserves. Sales of the foreign 
currency denominated assets result in reducing outstanding financial bills by redemption 
upon maturity (usually 3 months). There are a number of categories of FBs and legal 
limits on both the overall amount of FBs outstanding as well as the category of FBs used 
for financing foreign exchange purchases ("Foreign Exchange Fund Financing Bills"). 
This is shown in Table 1.  
Japan has long been the most active participant in the foreign exchange market 
among the major industrial countries (Ito, 2003; Fatum and Hutchison, 2002). However, a 
sharp departure with past policy-- in terms of magnitude and frequency-- started when 
Japan’s interventions became much more active starting on January 15, 2003 and 
continuing for more than a year until March 16, 2004 (Ito, 2004). During these four 
quarters, the MOF sold 35 trillion yen to purchase dollars. The first quarter of 2004 was 
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particularly intense, shown in Figure 1, as the MOF sold a total of 14.8 trillion yen. In 
line with the jump in foreign exchange intervention intensity, outstanding foreign 
exchange bills (FBs) jumped by 75% or 36.4 trillion yen between March 2002 and March 
2004. Similarly, foreign currency reserves held by Japan during this period jumped by 
almost 80 percent-- from $451.5 billion at year-end 2002 to $806.0 billion by the end of 
March 2004. Table 2 shows the rapid accumulation of foreign reserves in Japan during 
this period. The current level of foreign currency reserves of over $800 billion is the 
largest recorded in the post-war period in either real or nominal terms in Japan or 
elsewhere in the world. Foreign exchange reserves in Japan in early 2004 comprised 
about one-third of world's foreign exchange reserves.    
Surprisingly, there was no official announcement of a policy change in January 
2003 when the scale and frequency of intervention jumped. A dramatic departure in 
policy was evident since there had been no intervention in the market since June 28, 
2002. Nor was the move associated with a change in either the Finance Minister or the 
Governor of the Bank of Japan at the time. (Bank of Japan Governor Fukui was 
appointed in March 2003 and Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki took office in 
September 2003.) And Japan’s massive intervention in the foreign exchange market 
abruptly ended on 16 March 2004. Again there was no official statement by the 
government explaining why intervention operations were stopped so suddenly after more 
than a year of heavy intervention and the largest accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves ever recorded. Rather, Minister of Finance Tanigaki stated in late March that the 
MOF intervention policy had not changed (The Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 March 
2004).9
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 Ito (2004) points out that the interventions began (January 15) just a day after a 
new Vice Minister for International Affairs, Mr. Mizoguchi, took office. He also points 
out that the intervention was initially "stealth" intervention in the sense that the large-
scale intervention of the January-March 2003 was not disclosed until May of that year.  
 
3. Has intervention been effective in Japan? 
 
3.1 Recent Studies on Effectiveness of Bank of Japan Intervention 
Several recent studies of intervention find support for the effectiveness of intervention 
operations (for surveys of the literature see Dominguez, 2003; Dominguez and Frankel, 
1993; Edison, 1993; and Sarno and Taylor, 2001). In the context of this paper, five recent 
studies by Dominguez (2003), Ito (2003, 2004) and Fatum and Hutchison (2002, 2004) 
are of particular interest as all five investigate official BoJ intervention data at daily 
frequencies, employ very different methodologies in order to do so, yet arrive at quite 
similar conclusions.10
Table 3 provides a brief overview of these studies’ results on effectiveness of BoJ 
intervention. In order to assess the impact of BoJ intervention over the January 1991 
through June 2002 time-period, Dominguez (2003) analyzes the full sample as well as 
five separate sub-samples. Focusing first on short-term effects of intervention, she shows 
that for the full sample intervention has significant effects in the appropriate direction on 
4-hour exchange rate returns, while short-term effects on 8-hour exchange rate returns are 
insignificant. When addressing the issue of success during intervention, Dominguez 
(2003) finds that for only two of the five episodes is it the case that the JPY/USD 
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exchange rate moved in the appropriate direction over the period in which the 
intervention took place. Turning the focus to long-term effects, she finds evidence that 
the JPY/USD exchange rate moved in the appropriate direction within three months of 
the last intervention operation of the episode (or longer) for all five sub-samples. 
The study by Fatum and Hutchison (2002) notes that intervention in the JPY/USD 
exchange rate tends to come in clusters interspaced by pro-longed periods of no 
intervention, and suggests an event study as a particularly fitting methodology for 
analyzing the BoJ intervention data. Defining an event as a period of days with official 
intervention in the JPY/USD exchange rate in one direction (in terms of purchases or 
sales), conducted by the BoJ, the Fed, or both, and possibly including five consecutive 
days of no intervention, they identify 43 intervention events over the 10-year (April 1991 
to March 2001) period. Applying three different criteria for what may constitute 
effectiveness, Fatum and Hutchison (2002) find strong evidence that intervention 
systematically affects the exchange rate in the short-run. This main result holds even 
when intervention is not associated with (same-day) interest rate changes, and regardless 
of whether or not intervention is “secret” or reported in the news-wires. They also find 
that intervention was most likely to succeed when it was coordinated and large scale 
(amounts over USD 1 billion). 
Using a time-series framework with GARCH(1,1) specifications for addressing 
the issue of effectiveness, Ito (2003) investigates the April 1991 through March 2001 
time-period. He shows that intervention was more frequent and more predictable during 
the April 1991 to 20 June 1995 period, and finds that intervention was ineffective during 
this sub-sample. In fact, his results for this sub-sample suggest that intervention was 
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systematically associated with exchange rate changes in the opposite direction of what 
was presumably intended (i.e. BoJ purchases of USD were associated with USD 
depreciations). For the second sub-sample, 21 June 1995 through March 2001, Ito (2003) 
finds intervention was effective (i.e. the estimated coefficients are significant and of the 
“correct” sign). Additionally, his paper shows that coordinated intervention (by both the 
Fed and the BoJ) was more effective than unilateral intervention (BoJ only). 
In his recent paper, Ito (2004) investigates BoJ intervention during the January 
2003 through March 2004 time-period. Using a time-series methodology consistent with 
Ito (2003), he finds that the 2003-2004 interventions were effective, but his coefficient 
estimates suggest that the degree of impact declined to the level of 1/5 when compared to 
intervention carried out during the 1995-2003 sub-sample. Additionally, Ito (2004) finds 
initial interventions (i.e. intervention that wasn’t preceded by intervention for five days) 
to be more effective than subsequent interventions (i.e. intervention following days of 
intervention). 
 
3.2  The Event Study/Matching Approach 
Fatum and Hutchison (2004) introduce the matching methods methodology to the 
intervention literature in order to investigate the effectiveness of BoJ intervention while 
at the same time addressing the issue of sample selection. Fundamentally, studies of 
central bank intervention – where the effectiveness of intervention is assessed based on 
contemporaneous or subsequent exchange rate movements – are potentially contaminated 
by sample selection bias: Intervention typically occurs during periods of abnormal 
exchange rate movements and not when normal exchange rate market conditions prevail.  
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We observe intervention and its effects during a select sample period (typically of market 
turmoil), but not during more normal episodes. Hence, the value of a matching 
methodology is to "match up" economic circumstances that lead to intervention (similar 
probabilities of intervention), and differ only in that in one case intervention occurred and 
in another it didn't. Better estimates of the effectiveness of intervention may be obtained 
by using this methodology.  
The analysis of Fatum and Hutchison (2004) consists of two parts. In the first 
part, logit models of the BoJ’s decision to intervene are estimated. From these logit 
model estimates, the probability of intervention (a propensity score) for each day in the 
sample is derived. The sample is then split into a sub-sample of days when intervention 
actually occurred and a sub-sample of days when no intervention occurred. Regardless of 
whether or not intervention actually did occur on a given day, there is a uniquely defined 
intervention probability associated with each day in both sub-samples as well as a 
realized (day-to-day) change in the JPY/USD exchange rate. In the second part, a 
matching algorithm – the so-called “nearest neighbor” algorithm where each intervention 
observation is matched with the no-intervention observation that has the “nearest” 
propensity score - is implemented and the average effect of intervention on exchange 
rates (using each algorithm separately) is examined, using difference-in-means tests.  
The main findings of Fatum and Hutchison (2004) are summarized in Table 3 and 
the specific matching methods results are displayed in Table 4. Analyzing the most recent 
5 years of BoJ intervention data, the study finds that intervention was effective during the 
1999 to 2002 sub-sample, while intervention had no significant impact on the JPY/USD 
exchange rate during the 2003 sub-sample. For the first quarter of 2004, the study finds 
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that intervention was systematically associated with exchange rates moving in the 
opposite direction of what was intended by the intervening authority, suggesting that 
intervention may even be counterproductive rather than merely ineffective.  
Fatum and Hutchison (2004) note that the BoJ’s intervention frequencies across 
the January 1999 through March 2004 time-period have changed dramatically. 
Specifically, the BoJ intervened on an average of 3% of business days over the 1999 to 
2002 period during which the study finds support for effectiveness, compared to an 
intervention frequency of 35% of business days over the 2003 period during which the 
study finds no significant impact of intervention. In contrast, the intervention frequency 
rose to 85% over the first quarter of 2004, the sub-sample during which intervention 
appears to be significantly counterproductive.  
Table 4 shows the specifics of the matching methods results and, in particular, 
that the significant results found in the 1999 to 2002 and the first quarter of 2004 sub-
samples both stem primarily from the impact of single-day intervention operations (i.e. 
intervention operations that “stand alone” in the sense that intervention on a given day 
does not immediately succeed intervention on the previous day and is not succeeded by 
intervention on the following day) and first-day intervention operations (i.e. the first day 
of several consecutive days of intervention). 
 The described study finds intervention to be effective during a time-period of 
infrequent interventions while it finds intervention to be ineffective or even 
counterproductive during time-periods of very frequent intervention. Interestingly, these 
findings seem consistent with the time-series based study by Ito (2003), who shows that 
intervention during April 1991 to 20 June 1995 time-period characterized by frequent 
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interventions was ineffective while intervention during the 21 June 1995 to March 2001 
time-period characterized by relatively infrequent interventions was effective. 
Additionally, the findings of Fatum and Hutchison (2004) with respect to the first sub-
sample of their analysis – January 1999 through December 2002 - are in line with 
Dominguez (2003), who finds evidence of significant effects in the appropriate direction 
on both 4- and 8-hour exchange rate returns as well as 48-hour persistence when focusing 
on the two most recent episodes (January 1999 – April 2000 and September 2001 – June 
2002) in her data-set. However, Ito (2004) finds that BoJ intervention was effective over 
the (full) January 2003 through March 2004 time-period, while the results found in Fatum 
and Hutchison (2004) suggest that, after taking into account the issue of sample selection 
and based on investigations of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004 separately, the impact of 
intervention was insignificant during 2003 and, furthermore, significant but of the 
“wrong” sign during the first quarter of 2004.  
 
4. Was Intervention Sterilized? The BOJ Response to Intervention Operations  
Fatum and Hutchison (2004) and Ito (2004) find that intervention operations were less 
successful in 2003-04 period than in the late 1990s (e.g. evidence presented by Ito, 2003; 
Fatum and Hutchison, 2002). Moreover, we find the interventions of early 2004 to have 
been ineffective, which we argue is associated with the frequency and associated 
predictability of the operations compared to previous periods.  
Is the reduced effectiveness of intervention over the 2003-04 period, compared 
with the 1995-2002 period, related to the degree of sterilization? Unsterilized intervention 
can influence exchange rates in the same way as monetary policy by inducing changes in 
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the monetary base and, in turn, broader monetary aggregates, interest rates and market 
expectations. By contrast, the transmission mechanism by which sterilized intervention 
may systematically influence exchange rates is less clear and somewhat controversial in 
the literature.11  
Intervention operations carried out by the BoJ, on behalf of the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance, are generally regarded as automatically sterilized since the Ministry of 
Finance first raises the necessary funds for foreign exchange purchases by selling yen-
denominated bills to the market (Ito, 2003). Specifically, in the case of intervention 
aimed at dampening or reversing JPY appreciations, JPY-denominated financing bills are 
issued to the market and the proceedings are, in turn, used to purchase foreign currency 
denominated assets in the intervention operations. 
However, the BoJ may still respond to dollar purchase/yen sale intervention 
operations-- undertaken by its own foreign exchange dealers in the Foreign Exchange 
Division of the Financial Markets Department-- by increasing the money supply. In this 
context, the question arises as to the appropriate indicator to consider in measuring the 
BoJ's immediate (daily or weekly) and longer-term (monthly or quarterly) response to 
interventions directed by the Ministry of Finance.  
Our analysis is focused on the 2003-04 period during which time financial 
institutions' deposits in current accounts they hold with the BoJ ("current account 
balances" or CABs) was the primary operational target of Japanese monetary policy. This 
is the measure we employ in our analysis of daily sterilization operations. We 
complement the current account balance measure with the monetary base in the analysis 
of monthly and quarterly interactions between intervention and monetary policy.  
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 4.1 Short-run Sterilization 
In order to investigate whether BoJ interventions are systematically affecting the current 
account balance on a day-to-day basis, we carry out a time-series analysis of daily data. 
Specifically, we regress the first-difference of the BoJ current account balance ( ) 
on a constant (
CAB∆
α ), the contemporaneous and five (three) lags of intervention (INT), and 
an error term (ε ), as captured by the following equation: 
 
(1)  tit
i
it INTCAB εβα ++=∆ −
=
∑5
0
 
Since the funds required for carrying out interventions are raised by the MoF prior to the 
intervention operations taking place, complete sterilization is consistent with no CAB 
response to intervention. In other words, if intervention was indeed sterilized, we should 
expect the cumulative effect of intervention on the CAB to equal zero. 
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 5. The first two columns show 
the results based on the January to December 2003 sub-sample, with the regression 
reported in the first (second) column incorporating five (three) lags of intervention. None 
of the explanatory variables are statistically significant and, furthermore, the F-test of 
Sum Equals Zero (Wald-test) shows that the hypothesis of the sum of the estimated 
coefficients being equal to zero cannot be rejected. The last two columns show the results 
based on the January to March 2004 sub-sample, with the regression reported in the first 
(second) column incorporating five (three) lags of intervention. Although the first 
through third lag are significant in both regressions, the sign of the significant 
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coefficients alternate from negative to positive to negative and it appears that these 
effects on the CAB cancel each other out. This is confirmed by the F-test of Sum Equals 
Zero, which for both regressions suggests that the cumulative effect of intervention on the 
CAB is zero. 
In sum, this clearly suggests that intervention activity does not explain changes in 
the BOJ’s CAB and, as noted by Speigel (2003), there is little correlation between these 
two variables at a daily frequency. 
 
4.2 Is the BOJ Responding to the Intervention Policy Set by the MOF? 
The rapid increase in the Japanese base money at a time when the MOF/BOJ has 
undertaken prolonged large-scale intervention in support of the USD has caused 
speculations that the recent interventions are unsterilized over the course of months and 
quarters. For example, Spiegel (2003), discussing a Nikkei Financial Daily article, notes 
that “the total value of interventions from the beginning of 2003 until the end of August 
matched almost exactly the increase in the Bank of Japan’s current account balance over 
that period, suggesting that the Bank of Japan left the funds associated with its 
intervention activity in the market”. Although we do not find a connection between 
intervention and the current account at the daily frequency, it is entirely possible that the 
two variables are highly correlated at lower frequencies, such as monthly or quarterly 
data.  
Table 6, part A, and Figure 4 show the monthly totals of intervention juxtaposed 
against the monthly changes in the current account. Although both series are obviously 
trending upwards over the time-period under study, the two series do not appear highly 
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correlated on a month-to-month basis, with (monthly) correlation coefficients for the full 
and the 2003 samples of 0.34 and 0.28, respectively. 
Table 6, part B, shows stepwise-accumulated intervention totals next to stepwise 
accumulated current account changes. The displayed numbers confirm that the total value 
of interventions from the beginning of 2003 until the end of August matched the increase 
in the BoJ’s CAB over that same period. However, it also shows that this was in fact the 
only period over which accumulation of the two series would produce matching numbers, 
suggesting that the observed one-to-one correspondence between intervention and CAB 
is a random occurrence specifically pertaining to the January to August 2003 
accumulation period. 
 
5. Was BOJ policy more expansionary due to MOF intervention decisions in 2003-04?  
 
5.1 Purchases of foreign assets by the BOJ and repurchase agreements with the MOF 
The analysis in the previous section does not find any formal statistical evidence that the 
Bank of Japan responded to daily intervention operations by increasing bank reserves 
(current account balances). The linkage between intervention and current account 
balances over longer periods was also tenuous during the sample period. 
Intervention appears to have been sterilized in a technical sense since the Ministry 
of Finance raised yen-funds by selling bills to the private sector, and the Bank of Japan 
didn't respond by increasing base money. The main exception to this was in early 2004 
when the Ministry of Finance financed intervention operations by entering into a 
repurchase agreement of FEFSA-held U.S. Treasury Notes with the Bank of Japan. The 
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BOJ annual report summarized the operation: “On December 26, 2003, the Bank agreed 
with the Ministry of Finance that the Bank would purchase up to 10 trillion yen of 
FEFSA-held U.S. Treasury Notes with a resale agreement, as an indispensable but 
temporary means of financing until other means became available to the FEFSA, when 
the Ministry of Finance recognized that the FEFSA has virtually exhausted its room for 
short-term borrowing due to its budgetary limitations.” (Bank of Japan Annual Review 
2004, p. 67).12  
This request and operation is highly unusual (not used since 1987) and would 
have resulted in unsterilized intervention (i.e. an increase in the monetary base) had the 
BOJ not undertaken offsetting action. The Governor of the BOJ, in testimony to the Diet, 
stated that operation was “exceptional and temporary” and that he hoped it would not be 
repeated. (Reuters News, 22 March 2004; semi-annual testimony before parliament). The 
main motivation for this move was that the legal ceiling on borrowing in the foreign 
exchange account had almost been reached (The Japan Times, 10 January 2004). 
Increases in the limit have since been approved by the Diet (Table 1), and the repurchase 
of the securities was completed on schedule later in the year.    
 
5.2  Where is base money expansion coming from? 
The Bank of Japan is purchasing assets other than foreign currency in its expansion of the 
monetary base. Holdings of government securities held by the BOJ increased from 83.6 
trillion yen at end-September 2002 to 94.1 trillion yen at end-September 2004. This 10.5 
trillion yen rise represents about half the increase in the monetary base during the period. 
By contrast, BOJ holdings of foreign currency assets were virtually unchanged during the 
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past two years: 4.1 trillion yen at end-September 2002 to 4.4 trillion yen at end-
September 2004.13  
Clearly, the Bank of Japan expanded its balance sheet using instruments beyond 
traditional short-term government debt. This was likely a good strategy because short-
term government securities are "near money" in an environment of zero short-term 
interest rates and would not effectively provide monetary stimulus, i.e. amounting to 
purchases of "near money" (short-term government securities) from the private sector to 
create base money.  
 
5.3  Base Money and Intervention: Statistical Analysis 
The Bank of Japan, however, may have responded to exceptionally large interventions by 
the MOF in 2003-04 by pursuing a more expansionary policy than it otherwise would 
have done-- not by purchasing foreign-currency denominated assets from the FEFSA but 
by purchasing other assets and timing purchases such that they did not coincide closely 
with daily or weekly intervention operations. Ito (2004) points out, for example, that the 
increase in the monetary base and cumulative intervention from March 2001 to March 
2003 were almost identical but that it is not clear whether the BOJ and MOF were 
coordinating policy or whether it was a coincidence of two independent decisions (p. 13). 
 
Comparative Episodes 
It is not clear why January 2001- March 2004 is an appropriate base year to make a 
comparison since during the first two years of the period the MOF authorized 
intervention on only 7 days in late September 2001 and 7 days in late May and June 
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2002. There clearly was no link between cumulative intervention and base money 
increase in 2001-02, and a distinct shift in intervention policy occurred in early 2003. 
January 2001 is not a random date, but the only starting point that would put the two 
series (monetary base increase and cumulative intervention) coincident in March 2004. 
Moreover, Table 6 shows that cumulated intervention from January 2003 to March 2004 -
- the period of heavy intervention by the BOJ signaling a change in policy-- was about 35 
trillion yen while the increase in the monetary base was less than half of that amount 
(16.8 trillion yen). 
 We look at previous episodes of heavy intervention in order to assess whether 
BOJ policy during 2003-04 was unusual, i.e. whether recent policy appears more 
responsive or coordinated with intervention operations compared to previous experience. 
Figure 5 compares the cumulative intervention and base money increase during the three 
episodes since the early 1990s of intense and systemic intervention operations: April 
1993-March 1996 (base month: March 1993), January 1999-June 2000 (base month: 
December 1998), and the recent episode (January 2003-March 2004; base month: 
December 2002). The "base month" is the starting point whereby both series are set to 
zero.  
While the base money increase is less than half of cumulative foreign exchange 
intervention during the most recent episode, this pattern is not unusual. In all three 
episodes cumulative intervention significantly exceeded the increase in base money-- by 
56 percent during the 1993-96 episode, by 26 percent during the 1999-2000 episode and 
by 116 percent during the 2003-04 episode. There appears less linkage between 
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intervention and base money during the 2003-04 episode than previously, and no 
indication of coordination between the MOF and BOJ centering on intervention policy.  
 
Does intervention predict money growth?  
To directly address the issue of whether MOF intervention operations have influenced 
BOJ base money increases, we consider some simple base money equation estimates and 
forecasts. Firstly, we estimate a model that explains base money (changes) by 12 lags of 
base money, the call money interest rate and the magnitude of intervention. Estimating 
the equation over 1991:12 - 2004:09 (with monthly data), the coefficient on intervention 
is positive but insignificantly different from zero. Estimating the equation over a more 
recent period, 2001:01 to 2004:09, gives a negative but insignificant coefficient on 
intervention. These results suggest that intervention operations were not a determinant of 
money base growth in Japan over these periods.   
Secondly, we also consider structural stability of the equation in an attempt to detect 
whether a regime change in base money growth is linked with the timing of massive 
interventions starting in 2003. Recursive residuals (with 2 standard errors) are shown in 
Figure 6. This stability test finds instability, but beginning in 2000 or 2001 not in 2003. 
Using the 1991:12 – 2004:09 sample period, a formal Chow test of structural stability in 
2001:01 is rejected at the 1 percent level (F-Statistics is 2.15) but stability is not rejected 
at the 2003:01 breakpoint (F Statistic is 0.902). In the recent sample period where there 
was a structural break from past experience (2001:01-2004:09), there is no evidence of a 
structural break in 2003:01—the Chow test F-statistic is 0.34—at the time of large 
intervention operations.  
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Thirdly, we use the model to calculate two out-of-sample forecasts of base money 
growth. The first estimates the model to the point where the recursive residuals and the 
Chow tested indicated a breakpoint: 1991:12-2000:12 and (dynamically) forecasts base 
money growth for the 2001:01-2004:09 period. (This is a dynamic forecast in that lagged 
forecast values of money growth are used as explanatory variables beyond the estimation 
sample. Actual values of intervention and interest rates and used in the forecast interval). 
The forecast values, shown in figure 7, greatly underestimate the actual value of base 
money. Clearly, a fundamental policy shift—a move toward base money expansion-- is 
evident in early 2001.   
By contrast, when the model is estimated from 2001:01-2002:12—a stable period 
according the structural break tests—the forecast value of base money is very close to 
actual base money (figure 8) when it is forecasted out-of-sample over heavy intervention 
period (2003:01-2004:09). By September 2004, base money is only slightly lower than 
the forecast value. In sum, there is no evidence that the large intervention operations 
starting in 2003 led to more rapid base money creation by the BOJ. Rather, the shift in 
BOJ policy towards more rapid base money expansion occurred in early 2001-- two years 
before the shift in MOF intervention policy.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This article examines the rationale behind the massive increase in Japanese foreign 
exchange market intervention operations in 2003-04, and evaluates its effectiveness both 
in limiting yen exchange rate appreciation and influencing the direction of monetary 
policy.  
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 We find intervention is somewhat effective over short periods of time (several 
days), but less so in the recent period of very heavy intervention compared to previous 
episodes. We attribute this to the predictability of intervention in 2003, and especially 
2004 (due in turn to the intensity and frequency of operations), that in turn allows the 
market to anticipate these operations and accordingly formulates expectations into the 
level of the exchange rate.  
 Limited effectiveness of intervention in the most recent period, however, may 
also be associated with a high degree of sterilization. We consider institutional factors 
(how intervention is financed) and also statistically investigate whether current account 
balances set by the Bank of Japan are influenced by daily intervention operations. This 
analysis suggests that from a technical perspective the Bank of Japan has not allowed 
MOF intervention decisions to influence the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy. 
 In addition we do not find statistical evidence that the Bank of Japan has changed 
the direction of policy in response to large intervention operations in 2003-04. Base 
money growth was very rapid during this period but it was not associated with foreign 
asset purchases by the Bank of Japan. Moreover, cumulative foreign currency purchases 
by the MOF were more than twice as large as the increase in base money. Earlier 
episodes of intensive intervention were much more closely matched by base money 
increases than the 2003-04 period.  
 We also consider structural breaks in the money base equation and out-of-sample 
forecasts. We find that a structural break towards more expansionary base money 
expansion occurred in 2001, but not in 2003 when the shift in intervention policy 
occurred. Reflecting this structural break point, out-of-sample forecasts starting in 2001 
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(with the equation estimated through 2000) greatly underestimate base money growth 
over the 2001-04 period. However, out-of-sample forecasts starting in 2003-- with the 
equation estimated through 2002 and hence incorporating the structural break and 
expansionary base money growth that had already been underway for two years-- tracked 
observed base money growth very closely. 
 We have found no evidence that the Bank of Japan responded to intervention 
actions by the MOF in 2002-04 by increasing base money at a rate faster than it otherwise 
would have done. The BOJ on its own was attempting to stimulate the economy in 2001-
04 through rapid base money growth, but this was apparently not influenced by the 
"activist" intervention policy of the MOF during the latter part of this period.  
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Table 1 
 
Financing Bills 
 
(Trillion Yen) 
 
 
 
Total Financing Bills  Foreign Exchange  
               Fund Financing Bills 
 
 March 2000 (FY1999)  44.2   39.6 
 March 2001 (FY2000)  47.6   43.8 
 March 2002 (FY2001)  49.6   48.6 
 March 2003 (FY2002)  57.5   56.6 
 March 2004 (FY2003)  86.1   85.0 
 
 
 FY 2003 Legal Limit of Issuance 141.0   100.0  
  
FY 2004 Legal Limit of Issuance 171.0   140.0 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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Table 2 
 
Foreign Exchange Reserves in Japan 
Billions of USD 
 
 
Date   Official Reserve Assets Foreign Currency Reserves 
(End of Period) 
 
2002 Q1   401.5    385.7    
2002 Q2   446.2    428.9 
2002 Q3   460.7    443.1  
2002 Q4   469.7    451.5 
2003 Q1   496.2    477.8 
2003 Q2   545.6    526.6 
2003 Q3   604.9    584.1 
2003 Q4   673.5    652.8 
2004 Q1   826.6    806.0 
2004 Q2   818.0    798.6  
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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Table 3 Effectiveness of Bank of Japan Intervention: Five Recent Studies 
 
Study Time-period Methodology Key Findings 
    
Dominguez (2003) January 1991 – 
June 2002 
Event-study and 
time-series 
- Short-term effects in “right” direction 
- 48-hour persistence in 3 of 5 episodes   
- Not effective over duration of episode 
- Effective within 3 months of last  
   intervention operation 
    
Fatum and 
Hutchison (2002) 
April 1991 – 
March 2001 
Event study - Short-term effectiveness (less than  
  one month) 
- Effectiveness whether or not  
  supported by interest rate changes 
- Effectiveness whether secret or 
   reported in newswires 
- Most likely to succeed when  
  coordinated (both Fed and BoJ) and  
  large scale 
    
Fatum and 
Hutchison (2004) 
January 1999 – 
March 2004 
Matching 
Methods 
- Effective during 1999 – 2002 sub- 
  sample when intervention was  
  infrequent (3% of business days) 
- No significant effect during 2003 sub- 
  sample when intervention was more  
  frequent (35% of business days) 
- Ineffective during 1st Q 2004 sub- 
  sample when intervention was  
  extremely frequent (85% of business  
  days) 
    
Ito (2003) April 1991 – 
March 2001 
Time-series 
GARCH(1,1) 
- More frequent and more predictable in 
  April 1991 – 20 June 1995 sub-sample 
- Ineffective during April 1991 –  
  20 June 1995 sub-sample 
- Effective during 21 June 1995 -  
  March 2001 sub-sample 
- More effective when coordinated 
  (both Fed and BoJ) 
    
Ito (2004) January 2003 – 
March 2004 
Time-series 
GARCH(1,1) 
- Effective during 2003 – 2004 sample 
- Initial intervention operations more 
  effective than subsequent ones 
- Degree of impact smaller than during 
  1995 – 2003 sub-sample 
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Table 4 Matching Methods: January 1999 – March 2004. 
Intervention in terms of USD purchases => Expect positive sign 
 
 
 All Clusters All 
(CLALL) 
Clusters 
Middle 
Day 
(MD) 
Clusters 
Last Day 
(LD) 
SA and FD 
      
1999-
2002 
0.005110** 
(2.2664) 
0.002588 
(1.0027) 
n.a. 0.001322 
(0.4410) 
0.004896* 
(1.6075) 
      
2003 0.000179 
(0.2397) 
0.000085 
(0.1102) 
-0.000234
(-0.2320) 
0.001028 
(0.7025) 
0.000315 
(0.1099) 
      
2004 
Q1 
-0.001340* 
(-1.5707) 
-0.001340* 
(-1.5707) 
-0.000994
(-1.1189) 
-0.002178
(-0.6437) 
-0.003055** 
(-2.0842) 
      
 
Source: Fatum and Hutchison (2004)
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Table 5 The Bank of Japan Current Account and Intervention: Daily Dataa
 
Dependent variable:  The Bank of Japan Current Account (first-differences) 
 
 
Jan – Dec 2003  Jan – Mar 2004 
 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Constant   36.85  34.04  190.34  107.18 
    (63.35)  (58.97)  (255.96) (220.16) 
 
Intervention   0.59  0.58  0.30  0.42 
    (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.31)  (0.27) 
 
Intervention(-1)  -0.68  -0.67  -1.05*** -1.17*** 
    (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.37)  (0.35) 
 
Intervention(-2)  0.29  0.25  1.31*** 1.27*** 
    (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.21)  (0.23) 
 
Intervention(-3)  0.00  -0.05  -0.43*  -0.53** 
    (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.26) 
 
Intervention(-4)  -0.17    -0.03 
    (0.17)    (0.32) 
 
Intervention(-5)  -0.01    -0.46 
    (0.20)    (0.30) 
 
 
Observations   239  241  60  60 
 
R2    0.04  0.04  0.20  0.18 
 
Durbin-Watson  1.98  1.98  1.69  1.69 
 
F-test of Regression  1.54  2.23*  2.20*  3.03** 
 
F-test of Sum Equals Zero 0.01  0.07  0.33  0.00 
 
 
a) OLS regressions corrected for heteroskedasticity (using White’s standard errors). 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 99% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 95% level, * denotes significance at the 90% level. 
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Table 6   Intervention and the Bank of Japan Current Account: Monthly Data (a) 
    
Part A:   
  Total Monthly Intervention Monthly Change in Current Account 
  (Series 1 in Figure 4) (Series 2 in Figure 4) 
Jan-03 678.1 860 
Feb-03 1061.4 -200 
Mar-03 551.8 10710 
Apr-03 0 -4920 
May-03 3899.7 2930 
Jun-03 628.9 -10 
Jul-03 2027.1 320 
Aug-03 412.4 -130 
Sep-03 5111.6 5440 
Oct-03 1668.7 -4720 
Nov-03 1587.2 1180 
Dec-03 2619.6 -990 
Jan-04 6821.5 3940 
Feb-04 3476.6 -900 
Mar-04 4533.2 3290 
    
    
Part B:   
  Accumulated Intervention Accumulated Change in Current Account 
Jan-Feb 2003 1739.5 660 
Jan-Mar 2003 2291.3 11370 
Jan-Apr 2003 2291.3 6450 
Jan-May 2003 6191 9380 
Jan-Jun 2003 6819.9 9370 
Jan-Jul 2003 8847 9690 
Jan-Aug 2003 9259.4 9560 
Jan-Sep 2003 14371 15000 
Jan-Oct 2003 16039.7 10280 
Jan-Nov 2003 17626.9 11460 
Jan-Dec 2003 20246.5 10470 
Jan-Mar 2004 14831.3 6330 
Jan 2003 -Mar 2004 35077.8 16800 
    
    
a) All numbers in billions of JPY.  
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 Figure 1
JPY/USD Exchange Rate and 
Foreign Exchange Market Intervention 
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 Figure 2
Japanese Price Level and Short-term Interest Rate, 1998-2004
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Figure 3
Monetary Base Increase and JPY/USD Intervention
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Figure 4
Intervention and the BoJ Current Account: 
Monthly Changes
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Figure 5  
a. Japan's Money Base and BOJ Intervention, 1993-1996
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b. Japan's Money Base and BOJ Intervention, 1999-2000
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c. Japan's Money Base and BOJ Intervention, 2003-2004
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
Bank of Japan's Money Base Increase
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Figure 8 
Bank of Japan's Money Base Increase
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1 There was no intervention in the second quarter of 2004. 
2 The collateralized overnight interest rate (end of month) was lowered from 0.34 in December 1998 to 0.22 
in January 1999 and 0.07 in February 1999. The rate was raised to the 0.20-25 range for a few months in 
late 2000 and early 2001, but again lowered to below 0.01 for most of 2001 and through September 2004.   
3 The monetary base (percent changes from a year earlier in average amounts outstanding) rose 25.7% in 
2002, 16.4% in 2003, 13.8% in 2004Q1 and 6.1% in 2004Q2.  
4 Nominal GDP rose 0.3 percent in 2003 and at a similar annual rate in the first half of 2004. Real GDP 
growth, by contrast, indicated some recovery of the economy in 2003 and early 2004. (2003 real GDP 
growth was 3.2 percent). 
5 The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law stipulates that the "Minister of Finance shall endeavor to 
stabilize the external value of the yen through foreign exchange trading and other measures" (Article 7, 
Section 3). 
6 Foreign exchange interventions are usually conducted in the Tokyo market. However, as most of the 
trading shifts to European markets after around 5:00 p.m. JST and then to the New York market, the Bank 
of Japan requests foreign monetary authorities to conduct interventions on behalf of the Bank. The final 
decision to use this method is made by the Minister of Finance. The Minister also determines the details of 
the intervention including the amount, currency pair, and method of intervention (Bank of Japan, 
"Frequently Asked Questions: Outline of the Bank of Japan's Foreign Exchange Intervention Operations." 
July 2000).  
7 There are five types of Financial Bills (FBs), each of which is associated with some Special Account or 
the General Account of the Government of Japan’s budget. The FBs associated with the Foreign Exchange 
Funds Special Account accounts for the largest share in the amount of outstanding FBs, usually more than 
90 percent.  
8 See Ito (2002) for a detailed discussion.  
9 The issue of massive foreign exchange market intervention was not even a topic addressed in the "Japan: 
Selected Issues" of the IMF Country Report No. 03/282 on Japan published in September 2003.   
10 See, for example, Galati, Melick and Micu (forthcoming) and Truman (2003) for studies questioning the 
effectiveness of intervention. 
11 See Sarno and Taylor, 2001, for a recent survey of the theoretical and empirical literature, and 
Dominquez (2003) for a description and analysis of the foreign exchange market intervention the 1990s.  
12 The U.S. Treasury Notes were sold by the Bank of Japan back to the FEFSA by the end of June (as per 
the terms of the original agreement). 
13 The amount of foreign currency assets was 4.2 trillion yen at end-September 2003. 
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